3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
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equaled the demand for them; in 1791 the census listed half a million then living, but no writer seems to have even a vague idea of how many millions were imported during the sixty years of the colony's heyday.

Production, particularly of sugar and coffee, steadily increased until the tiny colony ranked among the wealthiest regions of the world. The Spanish Indies were declining, so that Saint-Domingue alone far outranked them all combined between 1766 and 1791. Splendid roads were built, extensive irrigation projects developed, and stately mansions erected. Life moved along with ceremony and display—for the planters; attended by their black lackeys, the white French masters entertained royally or were driven like lords in their coaches to make formal visits to neighbors. Many of these well-to-do colonials spent half their time in Paris, ostentatiously spending their riches. To be "wealthy as a Creole" came to be a common expression in France.[1] Perhaps nowhere in the Americas was existence at once so delightful and so ornamental as it was for the wealthy planters among the 36,000 whites of Saint-Domingue in 1791.

For the mother country, too, this small bit of tropical land was profitable during the latter days of Bourbon royalty. Neither Martinique nor Guadeloupe could compare with it in value. In 1789 nearly two thirds of the foreign commercial interests of France centred in Saint-Domingue; its combined exports and imports were valued at more than $140,000,000; its sugar, coffee, indigo, and cotton supplied the home market and employed in prosperous years more than 700 ocean-going vessels, with as many as 80,000 seamen.[2]

Where wealth exists, social distinctions generally develop. In Saint-Domingue the evolving class system produced such discord that sparks from the French Revolution eventually set off an explosion in the colony. Casual surveys of Haitian history generally record that in 1791 the slaves revolted, and that out of this insurrection grew the war of independence. This is true; but it was not the resentment of slaves against their masters which caused the final explosion; the slaves were tinder used by others to keep the conflagration burning. Negro slaves, of course, did not figure in the "class" system; they were below the classes of colonial society. The class system, properly

1. The word "creole" means only "colonial born"; there is no connotation of race mixture in the term.

2. Pamphile de Lacroix, *Memoires*, II, 277.

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to spend one's time in the allotted garden patch than to cultivate sugar cane steadily in the heat of the day. In a garden there was more variety to the work, and more independent decision; in a cane field all must work in unison to be effective. Moreover, the yield from the garden was a daily thing, while that of the cane fields came but once a year. Less and less were the overseers able to get the tenants away from their gardens and into the fields.

Not all the sabotage came from the common folk. Landowners had their normal share of profit motive. The complex system of social security and benevolent stewardship ate away much of the income of the estate.[29] More important, the owners had had no experience of plantation management other than by directing forced labor. Corporal punishment was now abolished, but to the owner it was still unthinkable that there should be no coercion in plantation work. The laws protecting labor therefore left them bewildered, and they did not hold up their part of the system. Finding it expensive to maintain sugar machinery, impossible to engage docile workers, and necessary to finance social security, most of the "aristocrats" simply took the easier path of leasing their estates in small subdivisions, getting out of them what they could.

Another unexpected result of Pétion's general policy was to shift the main produce of the republic from sugar to coffee. Sugar had for decades been the staple crop of southern Haiti; but its cultivation requires scrupulous care and expensive machinery. Coffee, on the other hand, grows wild both in the lowlands and at heights of three thousand feet. It is "wild" in the sense that plants spring from seeds dropped by parent trees, without careful planting. When it became obvious that the workers were not to be persuaded to regular work in the cane fields, the landlords broke up the large plantations so necessary to sugar cultivation. Each tenant farmer was almost sure to find coffee trees on his rented plot of land. He would harvest the berries but would do little or nothing to tend and improve the plants, as he did not own them. In French days coffee trees had been pruned, fertilized, grafted; the new Haitian farmer simply let nature take its course. Pétion's careful planning resulted consequently in an entirely unplanned, accidental, and automatic adjustment to new conditions of life.

29. That the landlords did not too vigorously protest this system of care for the workers was due to their familiarity with similar care in slave days.

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of living only for the day by making people content with a low level of physical existence. Haitian peasants were isolated from the rest of the world; and one who has no standard of comparison rarely has the incentive to improve his living conditions.

Production declined between 1806 and 1843 both in quantity and in quality. Sugar, the staple of colonial trade and still an important export under Christophe, disappeared from the market figures altogether under Boyer. Most of the cane which was raised was worked into syrup and then into tafia (raw rum) for local consumption. Careful attention and the well-ordered machinery necessary for sugar manufacture were both lacking in 1843. Sugar cane was almost never newly planted, but simply lasted on from French days; what plants there were had little attention: they were not manured, or ploughed, or stripped of their dead leaves. Everything was left to nature. The production of coffee in actual number of pounds stood up well, although the quality fell off through lack of cultivation; the price in world markets steadily declined, however, so that the crop of 1843 brought in only twelve million francs as compared with twenty million for the smaller crop of 1822.[63]

Practically every acre of the fertile soil of Haiti was cultivated in 1806, the methods steadily improving under Christophe. Irrigation projects were then being developed to replace those destroyed in the wars, and a measure of experimentation went on with new crops and fertilizers. In 1843, however, what was called a coffee "plantation" was actually only a large tract of land on which coffee trees grew wild. There was no laying out of the lands nor any improvement of the soil or pruning of the trees to strengthen the parent stem. Until the berries were ready to be picked the coffee tree was rarely touched, except when pigs scratched their backs on it, or goats and donkeys cropped the grass around it. Cotton likewise received little cultivation. Cocoa raising practically ceased altogether, for it required intelligent management.

Haiti under Dessalines still had many buildings of French con-

63. The state figures for 1843 revealed only four money crops, no one of which was as productive of income as sugar had been. In the comparative tables given below it must be remembered that prices declined between 1822 and 1843.

	5-Year Average, 1822–26	*1843*
Coffee	34,000,000 pounds	35,000,000 pounds
Cotton	678,000 "	2,000,000 "
Campêche	5,600 "	30,000,000 "
Acajou	2,460,000 feet	6,000,000 feet

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Justice in the courts was administered by Haitians whose narrow patriotism biased their decisions.

5. A temperamental tariff policy. Not only were imports subject to a tariff which might be changed at the whim of any president, but exports also were taxed. When an administration was in need of funds it might suddenly, without warning, raise the tax on coffee exports and so disrupt a merchant's business plans. The customs-houses were in charge of Haitians who steadily became more inefficient and grasping as the century progressed, until many foreign merchants felt that the only way of getting business dispatched was by means of bribes. Examinations at customs were long drawn out, often there was open thievery, and erroneous valuations were common.

6. The burden of the indemnity to France. Contracted by Boyer in 1825, this annual payment for sixty years was an incubus to every administration, leaving no surplus in the treasury for public works, education, or any internal development; likewise, it made the threat of foreign interference all the more imminent.

7. A debased currency. Pétion was the first president to devalue money, and his example was frequently followed thereafter. Counterfeiting was general. When a country's monetary system is unstable, its officials accustomed to bribery and graft,[17] and its financial structure almost nonexistent, there is little chance for sound economic development.

8. Dependence upon a single crop. Haitian economy was tied to the staple coffee, grown with indifferent care, prepared for the market in outmoded fashion, and sold in competition with coffee from more scientifically run plantations in other tropical countries.

9. Political instability. The recurrent revolutions in Haiti made foreigners chary of participating in the country's business, since the government which made a contract might be out of office before the ink was dry.

10. Indifference of the élite to economic pursuits. What profits were obtainable went into the pockets of foreign merchants, not those of Haitian businessmen. In 1842 the comparative exports of the

[643] 159 [661] 17. Sir Spenser St. John, always a bitter critic of Haiti, remarked (*Hayti, or The Black Republic*, p. 88) sardonically that "Boyer had the rare quality of being honest, and left in the treasury, on his departure, the sum of £200,000, the first and last chief who was ever guilty of so unaccountable a weakness."

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of Lafitte in Paris to find even the interest for payments due to the French government.

4. Exports from Haiti

Sugar was the great crop of French colonial days in Saint-Domingue, with coffee, indigo, and cotton lucrative secondary crops. The first table shows the rapid decline of sugar, indigo, and cotton between 1791 and 1839, near the end of Boyer's administration.

CROPS

	Sugar	*Indigo*	*Cotton*
1791 (colony)	163,405,220 lbs.	930,016 lbs.	6,286,126 lbs.
1802 (Toussaint)	53,400,000	37,600	4,050,000
1804 (Dessalines)	47,600,000	35,400	3,000,000
1818 (Pétion)	1,896,449	0	384,001
1825 (Boyer)	2,020	0	815,697
1839 (Boyer)	6,000	0	1,402,792

By contrast coffee production, although it declined, remained large enough to provide the state with some income. After 1810 it was the principal crop of the country.

Coffee Production

1791	68,151,180 lbs.	1818	20,280,589 lbs.
1802	34,370,000	1825	36,034,300
1804	31,000,000	1839	43,854,666

In 1935–36 the Vincent government reported the export of 76,600,000 pounds of sugar, 79,400,000 pounds of coffee, and 12,700,000 pounds of cotton.[11]

CHAPTER XV

What Haiti faces, economically and socially, can be seen in terms of the law of population: "Population tends to increase up to the limit of the supporting power of the land, relative to the economic efficiency and to the standard of living of the people at the time." This law may be better visualized by stating it in forms of an equation:

$$\frac{\text{Population}}{\text{Productivity of land}} = \frac{\text{Economic Efficiency}}{\text{Standard of Living}}$$

Another way of stating the law is this:

Population + Standard of Living = Productivity of Land + Economic Effi-

11. These tables are compiled from material in Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Description . . . de . . . Saint-Domingue, passim*; Great Britain Foreign Office, *Communications Relative to Hayti* (London, 1825), p. 159; Charles Mackenzie, *Notes on Hayti*, II, 172 ff.; Alexandre Bonneau, *Haïti: ses progrès, son avenir* (Paris, 1862), pp. 35, 36; John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, p. 105; L.-J. Marcelin, *Haïti: ses guerres civiles* (Paris, 1892), p. 32; Charles F. Pressoir, "Pages de géographie économique," *Revue de la Société d'Histoire*, III, vi, 18; James Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti*, pp. 318 ff.; *Rapport annuel du représentant fiscal d'Haïti*, October, 1935–September, 1936, pp. 189–195.